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Abstract: This article endeavors to give an
answer to the question whether and to what
extent philia (friendship), as it is treated by Ar-
istotle in Rhetoric II 4, can be considered a
genuine emotion as, for example, fear and
anger are. Three anomalies are identified in
the definition and the account of philia (and
of the associated verb philein), which suggest
a negative response to the question. How-
ever, these anomalies are analysed and ex-
plained in terms of the specific notes of philia
in order to show that Rhetoric II 4 does allow
for a consideration of friendship as a genuine
emotion.
Keywords: Persuasion, rational desire, good
will.
Resumen: Este artículo se ocupa de dar una
respuesta a la pregunta de si, y hasta qué
punto, la philia (amistad), tal como es tratada
por Aristóteles en Retórica II 4, puede consi-
derarse una genuina emoción tal como son,
por ejemplo, el miedo y la ira. El autor iden-
tifica y discute, en tal sentido, tres anoma-
lías en la definición y el tratamiento de la
philia (y el verbo asociado, philein) en este
texto, que podrían inclinar hacia una res-
puesta negativa a la pregunta inicial. No obs-
tante, cada una de estas anomalías es ana-
lizada y explicada en términos de las notas
específicas de la philia, para mostrar que, en
efecto, la presentación de Retórica II 4 per-
mite considerar de todos modos a la amis-
tad como una genuina emoción.
Palabras clave: Persuasión, deseo racional,
benevolencia.
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he various senses of the word philia in Aristotle can be sub-
sumed under different categories (‘categories’ in the Rylean
rather than the Aristotelian sense).1 Above all, philia desig-
nates a relation, a specific way two personal subjects are related to
each other; furthermore, it is a more or less permanent trait, a prop-
erty, of each of the friends: the property of being a friend with some-
one else. Since, according to Aristotle, friendship in the proper sense
is something that must be fostered or cultivated, real philia is to be
actualized in episodes of friendly contact and encounter, while there
are other, less rigid senses of philia in which it is regarded as a mere
disposition. Due to the notorious question whether philia is a kind of
virtue or a virtue of a kind or something that is not a virtue but
closely connected with virtue, one could wonder whether philia is
sometimes an achievement or effort and sometimes more like a ca-
pacity, namely the capacity to make friends and maintain existing
friendships. Finally, the word philia occurs in a category that seems
to be quite different from or even excluded by some of the afore-
mentioned categories: the category of emotions or affections. Of
course, one might wonder whether philia in its fullest sense will com-
prise several aspects, such as a relation, a character trait (hexis), a ca-
pacity, disposition or affection, but philia qua affection is not to be
confused with philia qua relation or qua character trait, etc. 
The somehow bewildering ambiguity of the word philia in Ar-
istotle might be seen against a much broader background concern-
ing the general character of friendship in antiquity. There is an
T
1. The first version of this paper was read at a conference on philia organized by
Pierre Destrée at the Universities of Louvain-la-Neuve and Leuven in May 2004.
At this conference I had the opportunity to learn about the views of David Kon-
stan, who in his paper defended an idea that was quite similar to mine (though, of
course, not with the same arguments), namely the idea that one has to refer to Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric in order to defend the emotional aspects of philia. I am also grateful
for the opportunity to deliver a revised version of this paper at the University of
Exeter in February 2008. For the final revision of my paper I was in the fortunate
situation that I could already make use of D. KONSTAN, The Emotions of the Ancient
Greeks. Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature (University of Toronto Press,
Toronto, 2006) and Aristotle on Love and Friendship, “ΣΧΟΛΗ” 2/2 (2008) 207-212,
in which his theses from the 2004 conference were discussed at greater length and
in a broader context.
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on-going debate about whether ‘friendship’ in the ancient world was
primarily seen as a pragmatic relationship involving mutual ex-
change, the expectation of mutual support, etc., in which affective el-
ements did not play any remarkable role, or whether friendship
essentially consisted in affective bonds between friends. Some sup-
porters of the former view seem to think that the accentuation of
emotional elements rests on an anachronistic picture of ancient
friendship and tends to read our modern expectations concerning
the requirements for genuine friendship into an altogether different
ancient notion of friends.2
Against this background, it might indeed be pertinent to note
that there are passages in Aristotle where he unambiguously men-
tions philia and its cognate philein as instances of pathê, i.e. affections
or emotions. In Nicomachean Ethics II 4, 1105b21-23, and De Anima
I 1, 403a16-18, philia and philein are even mentioned in lists that are
meant to illustrate what it means to be an ‘affection of the soul’
(pathos tês psuchês). From passages like these it clearly follows that for
Aristotle philia can be an emotion —at least in some of its multiple
usages. Still, it is possible that philia is just homonymous, meaning
the relations between friend in one usage and the emotion in an-
other independent usage. This sheer homonymy, it seems, can be
excluded by the usage of philia and to philein in Rhetoric II, chapter 4:
Here again, Aristotle clearly lists philia and to philein among pathê
such as anger, fear, envy, pity, gratitude, indignation, shame, etc. At
the same time the definition of philia refers to the relation between
friends, so that there is an important, perhaps even essential mutual
nexus between the emotion of philia and the relation between
friends. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether and to what
extent philia is actually meant as an emotion or sentiment in chapter
II 4 of the Rhetoric. There are some obstacles to this view; for exam-
2. D. KONSTAN, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1997) has defended an “affective” reading of friendship. However, this does
not seem to be the majority view, as M. PEACHIN (ed.), Aspects of Friendship in the
Greco-Roman World, “Journal of Roman Archaelogy” Suppl. 43 (2001) attests. Some
reactions to Konstan’s reading are reported in D. KONSTAN, The Emotions cit., and
Aristotle on Love and Friendship cit.
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ple, one cannot help but notice that there are certain differences be-
tween philia and other emotions in the Rhetoric. In the course of the
paper these differences as well as other difficulties for the view that
philia is pictured as a genuine emotion will be addressed and dealt
with. I will not attempt to tackle the more general questions con-
cerning the nature of friendship in the ancient world,3 nor will I try
to compare the treatment of philia in the Rhetoric to the much more
extended and famous account of philia in Aristotle’s ethical writings.
I.
Perhaps we should start with some general remarks about the pur-
pose of the emotions in the second book of the Rhetoric. Aristotle’s
inquiry into the elements of persuasion in Rhetoric I and II leads to
the conclusion that there are exactly three technical means of per-
suasion; they are derived either from the character of the speaker,
or from the argument (logos) itself, or from the emotional state of
the hearer.4 Regarding the latter means of persuasion, Aristotle em-
phasizes that we do not judge in the same way when we grieve and
rejoice or when we are friendly and hostile. Thus, the orator has to
arouse emotions exactly because emotions have the power to mod-
ify our judgments: to a judge who is in a friendly mood, the person
whom he is going to judge seems to have done little or no wrong; but
to the judge who is in an angry mood, the same person will seem to
have done the opposite (cf. Rhetoric II 1, 1378a1 et seq.). Many in-
terpreters writing on the rhetorical emotions were misled by the role
of the emotions in Aristotle’s ethics: they suggested that the orator
has to arouse the emotions in order to motivate the audience or to
make them better persons (since Aristotle requires that virtuous per-
sons do the right things together with the right emotions). The first
thesis is wrong for the simple reason that the aim of rhetorical per-
3. Even in the Rhetoric there are clear references to friends and friendship in the mere-
ly or mostly pragmatic sense just described. For example, in Rhetoric II 5, 1383b1-3,
Aristotle points out that people with many friends have less reason to be anxious,
because they can expect their friends to support them in dangerous situations.
4. Rhetoric I 2, 1356a1-20. 
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suasion is a certain judgment (krisis), not an action or practical deci-
sion (prohairesis). The second thesis is also beside the point, because
moral education is not the purpose of rhetoric nor could it be ef-
fected by a public speech: In the final chapter of the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle says: “Now if speeches were in themselves enough
to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won
very great rewards … but as things are they are not able to encour-
age the many to nobility and goodness.”5
How is it possible for the orator to bring the audience to feel a
certain emotion? Aristotle’s technique essentially rests on the knowl-
edge of the definition of every significant emotion. Let, for example,
anger be defined as “desire, accompanied with pain, for conspicuous
revenge for a conspicuous insult that was directed against oneself or
those near to one, when such an insult is undeserved.”6 According to
such a definition, someone who believes that she has suffered an in-
sult from a person, who is not entitled to do so, etc., will —ceteris
paribus— become angry. If we take such a definition for granted, it
is possible to deduce circumstances in which a person will most
probably be angry; for example, we can deduce (i) in what state of
mind people are angry and (ii) against whom they are angry, and (iii)
for what sorts of reason. Aristotle deduces these three factors for
several emotions in Rhetoric II 2-11. With this equipment, the ora-
tor will be able, for example, to highlight those characteristics of a
case that are likely to provoke anger in the audience. In comparison
with the tricks of old-fashioned rhetoricians, this method of arous-
ing emotions has a striking advantage: the orator who wants to
arouse emotions need not even speak outside the subject; he need
not confuse or distract the audience; it is sufficient that he detect
and highlight those aspects of a given subject that are intrinsically
connected with the intended emotion.
5. Nicomachean Ethics X 9, 1179b4-10.
6. Rhetoric II 2, 1378a31-33.
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II.
Against this background, it is easy to imagine situations in which it
is useful to arouse friendly or hostile feelings in the course of a pub-
lic speech and to describe either one of the litigants, or one of the
political opponents, or the person of the orator himself as the proper
target of such emotions. Of course it is not required that the re-
spective person actually deserves these feelings. This is clear from
the remark that concludes this chapter: 
“From this, then, it is obvious that it is possible to demonstrate
that people are enemies or friends and to make them so when
they are not and to refute those who claim that they are and to
bring those who oppose us because of anger or enmity to
whichever side one might prefer. — φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι
ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ
ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας διαλύειν, καὶ δι᾽ ὀργὴν ἢ δι᾽ ἔχθραν
ἀμφισβη τοῦντας ἐφ᾽ ὁποτέραν ἂν προαιρῆταί τις ἄγειν.”7
Concerning this quotation, one has to be aware that this very last
sentence of the chapter is the only remark in the entire chapter that
explicitly applies the general definitions and distinctions concerning
philia to rhetorical purposes. Since this is a characteristic of so many
chapters in the Rhetoric on various concepts, it is tempting to think
that those catalogues (about eudaimonia, pleasure, good, better and
worse, the different emotions, the different types of character, and
so on), which are so typical of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, were composed
independently from the specific functions they finally received
within the Rhetoric. And if this, again, is at least partly true, it is not
possible to explain all the anomalies of the Rhetoric and all the ways
it differs from other writings just by its rhetorical-pragmatic pur-
pose. This should be kept in mind for the following discussion.
Let us continue with the passage just quoted above (1382a16-
19): If it is possible, as Aristotle says, to make people friends or en-
7. Rhetoric II 4, 1382a16-19. Translation based on G. A. KENNEDY (ed.), On Rhetoric: A
Theory of Civic Discourse (Oxford University Press, New York, 1991).
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emies when they are not, this cannot mean that the orator creates
real stable friendships; it must mean that the orator is able to bring
about the emotions that typically accompany friendship in the
proper sense. Hence, we can prima facie assume that the concept of
philia in Rhetoric II refers to an emotion that is either an ingredient
or a precondition of the fully fledged relation of philia that is dis-
cussed in the ethical writings.
Nevertheless, we cannot just take it for granted that in the
rhetorical context philia is always the emotion and not the relation
of friendship; there are several reasons why we should be cautious.
One of these reasons lies in some anomalies in the discussion of philia
and echthra (hate) with which we will soon be faced. Another reason
is that the list of emotions that Aristotle gives in the Rhetoric includes
more than one item that cannot be seen as real emotion at all. For
example, in the previous chapter (Rhetoric II 3) he mentions praotês
(calmness, gentleness, or softness) which figures in the Nicomachean
and Eudemian Ethics not as emotion, but as virtue. And, what is prob-
ably even more telling, not even in the Rhetoric does Aristotle suc-
ceed in proving praotês an emotion; everything he says about it
concerns the question of how we can calm down an angry person.
Similarly, the states of mind which are said to be opposed to the
emotions of shame (in chapter II 6) and gratitude (in chapter II 7) are
either the absence or the termination of those emotions, but are not
themselves emotions in the strictest sense. Thus, the mere fact that
Aristotle mentions philia as an item in a list of emotions is an im-
portant indication that philia is somehow meant to be intimately con-
nected with emotions, but this is not yet reliable evidence that philia
itself is a real emotion in the context of the Rhetoric. 
III.
To get to the bottom of the problem we have to discuss the defini-
tion of philia in Rhetoric II 4:
“Whom people love and whom they hate, and why, let us say
after having defined ‘friendship’ and ‘loving’. Let ‘loving’ be
wanting for someone what one regards as goods, for his sake
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but not for one’s own, and being productive of these (goods) as
far as one can. A friend is one who loves and is loved in return;
and they think that they are friends when they think that their
mutual relation is of this character. — Τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ
μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ὁρισάμενοι λέγωμεν.
ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου
ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι
τούτων. φίλος δ’ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντι φιλούμενος8 οἴονται δὲ9
φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.”10
It is striking that this opening passage mentions not only philia but
also the verbal form philein;11 it is likely that the verb philein is meant
to refer to the emotion rather than to the relation or the property.
In Nicomachean Ethics 1105b21f., Aristotle calls philia itself a pathos
(affection, emotion);12 in a similar context in De Anima 403a16-18 he
replaces philia by the verb philein, although the previous examples
were given as nouns —obviously in order to avoid the ambiguity of
the noun philia.13 It is true that philein can also refer to the outward,
visible effects of an affectionate attitude, but since it is defined here
as a kind of wanting or wishing, it cannot exclusively mean the out-
ward dimension of a sympathetic attitude; further, it is opposed to
misein (to hate), which clearly indicates an emotional attitude. 
Further, the passage in question (1380b34-1381a3) distin-
guishes between the definition of ‘philein – to love, to have friendly
8. R. KASSEL (ed.), Aristotelis Ars rhetorica (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1976), regarded the
words [[φίλος … ἀντι φιλούμενος]] as a later addition by Aristotle himself. 
9. Spengel suggested γάρ instead of δέ.
10. Rhetoric II 4, 1380b34-1381a3.
11. I have translated the Greek verb ‘philein’ with ‘to love’, which is, I know, a quite ar-
bitrary translation; I have done so just to avoid a paraphrase such as ‘to have friendly
feelings’.
12. Nicomachean Ethics II 4, 1105b21-23: “… By affections I mean appetite, anger, fear,
boldness, envy, joy, love, hatred (φιλίαν μῖσος), longing, emulation, pity and gener-
ally all that is followed by pleasure and pain”.
13. De Anima, 403a16-19: “Even all the affections of the soul, anger, gentleness, fear,
pity, confidence, and, joy, loving, and hating (τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν) seem to be to-
gether with the body”. Although there is a clear tendency to prefer to philein, when
it comes to the sentiment or emotion, the above-quoted use in Nicomachean Ethics
1105b21f. shows that philia can also be used to refer to the emotion. 
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feelings’ and the definition of being a friend or of thinking one is a
friend. Kassel’s edition of the Rhetoric indicates that the sentence
“A friend is one who loves and is loved in return” (1381a1-2) is a
later addition by Aristotle; obviously, Kassel regards this sentence as
a redundant parenthesis, because an additional definition of ‘friend’
does not seem to be required. But we could also argue for keeping
the sentence in the text, because the first sentence of the chapter
announced a definition of philein and of philia as well, and the def-
inition of the philos comes close to a definition of philia. Hence, no
matter whether we accept Kassel’s suggestion or not, it is clear that
the present passage proceeds from a basic definition of the verb
philein to the definition of a friend or of the state in which we feel
like we are being friends. While the basic definition of philein men-
tions that we want or wish good things for the other person and
that we try to promote such goods for the person we love, the def-
inition of what it is to be a friend mentions two further aspects: first,
that the friendly affection must be reciprocal (what is called ‘an-
tiphilêsis’ in the Nicomachean Ethics), and second, as the last sentence
implies, that friends must be somehow aware of the other person’s
friendly attitude. 
But let us start with the basic definition of the verbal form
‘philein – to love’. The first criterion, that we want or wish for some-
one what we regard as good and that we want it for her sake and not
for our own, is, of course, crucial for the Aristotelian concept of
friendship; in the Ethics this is exactly what is called ‘eunoia – good
14. Nicomachean Ethics VIII 2, 1155b31-1156a5: “…people say that one wish a friend
good things for his sake. Those who whish good things for someone else like this
are said to have goodwill (τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν) if the
same is not forthcoming from the other party as well; friendship, they say, is good-
will between reciprocating parties. Or should one add that it must not be latent?
For many people have goodwill towards those whom they have not met, but sup-
pose to be decent, or useful; and one of these might in fact be in the same position
in relation to them. Goodwill, then, is what these people evidently feel towards
each other; but how could one call them friends, if they are not aware of their mu-
tual feelings? Therefore, friends must have goodwill towards each other and must
wish each other goods, being aware of the other’s doing so, for one of the men-
tioned reasons”. Translation based on S. BROADIE (ed.), Ch. ROWE (trans.), Aristot-
le. Nichomachean Ethics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002).
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will’. According to Nicomachean Ethics 1155b31ff.,14 those who wish
good things for someone else are said to have good will, and good
will, in turn, seems to be a necessary precondition of friendship. And
according to the same text, good will as such is not sufficient for
friendship, because friendship requires mutual good will and aware-
ness of it. This account is completely in line with the passage in Rhet-
oric 1380b34ff., and it almost seems as if we could equate good will
with the concept of ‘loving – philein’ in the Rhetoric. But in Eudemian
Ethics 1241a10f. it turns out that there is also an important difference
between mere good will and loving:
“But goodwill shows itself in merely wanting, friendship in also
doing what one wants. For goodwill is the beginning of friend-
ship; every friend has goodwill, but not all who have goodwill
are friends. Whoever has goodwill resembles a person who is
only about to begin; and therefore it is the beginning of friend-
ship, but not friendship. — ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι
μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ
εὔνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὔνους, ὁ δ᾽ εὔνους οὐ
πᾶς φίλος. ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ
φιλίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φιλία.”15
So, good will can be the beginning of friendship, but real friendship
presupposes specific activities that are the outward signs of good will.
But exactly these activities are mentioned as the second criterion of
philein in our Rhetoric passage, where it is required that the friend be
productive of the wished-for goods as far as he can; we can conclude,
then, that ‘philein – loving’ implies significantly more than mere
good will. One secondary characteristic of loving is that it involves
appropriate actions that express good will and are not only the be-
ginning or trigger of a friendship but also concomitants of an exist-
ing friendship. 
15. Eudemian Ethics VII 7, 1241a10-14. 
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In Nicomachean Ethics 1166b30ff. and 1157b28,16 Aristotle con-
trasts good will with another notion of loving, namely philêsis. It is
therefore tempting to ask whether this philêsis corresponds to philein
in our Rhetoric-passage, as we expect both philêsis in this passage of
the Nicomachean Ethics and philein in the Rhetoric to be something
more ‘passionate’ than the rather rational and perhaps even ‘cold-
blooded’ good will. Indeed, Aristotle says of philêsis that it is more
like a passion or emotion, while good will is more like a disposition,
and things being done out of good will rely on a decision and are
not necessitated by an emotion. For example, the spectator of a com-
petition can suddenly feel good will for one of the contestants with-
out being inclined to help or to cooperate. Furthermore, philêsis is
said to involve a sort of tension and desire, while good will does not.
This is a remarkable characterization. What does it imply? And
is it applicable to philein in the Rhetoric? First of all, the Greek word
for tension, ‘diatasis’, does not occur very often in Aristotle; when it
does, it is in physiological contexts, with one occurrence clearly re-
ferring to digestion;17 as for the aforementioned passage, I found
16. Nicomachean Ethics IX 5, 1166b30-1167a10: “Goodwill seems to be a feature of
friendship, but is not the same as friendship, for goodwill occurs even for people we
do not know and without their being aware of it, while friendship does not. We
spoke about that earlier. Nor is it loving, for it includes neither tension nor desire
(ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ᾽ ὄρεξιν), while those things are im-
plied by loving. And loving involves familiarity, while goodwill can occur all of a
sudden, as it happens e.g. towards contestants, for people start to feel goodwill to-
wards them, and want together with them, but they would not cooperate with them,
since, as we said, the goodwill occurs suddenly and their love is superficial. Goodwill
seems, then, to be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure gained through
sight is of being in love: no one is in love without first having felt pleasure at the way
the other looks, but delighting in someone’s looks does not mean that one is in love,
which is rather a matter of longing for him when he is not there and wanting him to
be there; just so, then, while it is not possible for people to be friends if they have not
felt goodwill towards each other, feeling goodwill towards each other does not make
them friends, since if a person feels goodwill he only whishes for good things for the
other, and he would not cooperate, or go to any trouble on his behalf”. Nicomachean
Ethics VIII 7, 1157b28-33 (Rowe’s translation): “Loving resembles an affection of
the soul, whereas friendship a disposition (ἔοικε δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φίλησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία
ἕξει) for one can feel love no less towards inanimate than towards animate objects,
but reciprocal loving involves decision, and decisions flow from dispositions, and
when people whish good things for these they love for these others’ sake, this is not
a matter of affective state but of disposition.”
17. De partibus animalium III 3, 664a33. 
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myself unable to decide whether it is a metaphorical expression for
longing or whether it literally refers to a sort of physiological change.
In general, such physiological changes are typical for episodes of
emotion; however, the Rhetoric is in general silent about the physio-
logical aspects of the various emotions —even in cases that clearly in-
volve specific bodily alterations. Hence, the association with diatasis
is apt to lead one to picture philêsis as more passionate than good
will, but there is no hope of finding a corresponding characterization
in the Rhetoric.
Next, philêsis is said to be a sort of desire (orexis), while good
will is not. In general, Aristotle uses orexis as a generic term for two
non-rational and one rational kind of desiring; the non-rational
kinds are epithumia and thumos and the rational kind is ‘boulêsis —
wanting’. Sometimes, however, it seems as if Aristotle wants to de-
viate from this prevalent usage; this happens when he regards orexis
as being opposed to nous or logos and, thus, also to the rational form
of desiring, i.e. wanting.18 In the generic sense of orexis, which ex-
plicitly includes rational desire or wanting, it would be awkward to
say that good will does not involve desire, given that good will is de-
fined as a sort of wanting. For this reason one might be inclined to
think it is the non-generic sense of orexis that matters in this context.
Indeed, the notion of non-rational desires would be quite useful to
contrast the more passionate philêsis with the more detached good-
will. However, on this reading of orexis the notion of philein in the
Rhetoric would rather side with good will than with philêsis, since
philein is defined —just as good will— as a sort of wanting, i.e. as a
sort of rational desire. And this is exactly one of the reasons why
people have wondered whether philein in the Rhetoric is really meant
as a genuine emotion or whether it rather boils down to a sort of in-
tending. 
Another way of deciphering Aristotle’s remark that philêsis and
good will are different, because the former is a sort of orexis, while
the latter is not, could be this: for Aristotle, intentional action al-
18. Sometimes De Anima 434a12 and De Motu Animalium 701b1 are thought to exem-
plify such a non-generic use of orexis.
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ways involves a preceding orexis. One or the other sort of desire is in-
volved in each instance of purposeful acting. Therefore, saying that
good will does not involve desire, while philêsis does, could be just an-
other way of indicating that good will alone does not lead to appro-
priate actions, while other positive affections do. On this alternative
reading, philein in the Rhetoric would rather side with philêsis than
with good will. And wherever there is orexis, there is an accompany-
ing physiological alteration, so that diatasis, physiologically inter-
preted, could be a concomitant to desire. 
Now as a matter of fact, the only emotion in the Rhetoric that is
explicitly defined as a sort of desire is anger, for anger is seen as a de-
sire for revenge. Loving (philein), by contrast, is defined as a sort of
wanting; hence, it seems that loving can only be said to be a sort of
desire in virtue of its being a sort of wanting and in virtue of the Aris-
totelian doctrine that wanting or wishing is a sort of desire. Now, it
may seem somehow awkward to say that philein, being defined as
wanting good for someone else, is thought to be connected with de-
siring, while good will, being also defined as wanting good for some-
one else, is not. Indeed, if such an interpretation is seriously pursued
one would have to say something to the effect that whether a wish in-
volves an appropriate course of action or not (which, as we have said,
is the difference between philein and mere good will) defines two dif-
ferent kinds of wanting or two different degrees of it: motivating
wishes on the one hand, which involve desire as they result in action,
and mere preferences or wishful attitudes on the other hand.19
IV.
Whereas other emotions are defined as a sort of pain, or agitation
(tarachê), or as mixtures of pleasure and pain, philia is the only emo-
tion whose definition does not even mention pleasure and pain;
rather, it is the only emotion that is defined as a kind of wanting
(boulesthai). Though Aristotle nowhere offers a straight definition of
19. Immanuel Kant assumes a similar distinction between ‘wollen’ and ‘wünschen’, the
former of which involves appropriate efforts, while the latter does not. 
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pathos (emotion or affection), it is not coincidental that the other
emotions are defined by reference to pleasure and pain, because
every time Aristotle introduces pathê in the sense of emotions he
stresses that they are followed by pleasure and pain, as we already
saw in Nicomachean Ethics 1105b21. Obviously, he prefers to intro-
duce pathê by a list of examples, and not by a proper definition; these
lists are not even constant; it is striking, for example, that epithumiai
are sometimes mentioned as emotions and sometimes not. It seems
to be especially important that there is one feature shared by all emo-
tions: that they are followed by pleasure and pain. Once, he even
says that pathê are determined (diôristai) by pleasure and pain, which
comes close to a definitional requirement.20 There is only one pas-
sage, in the Eudemian Ethics (1220b12-14), where Aristotle says that
they are not always, but for the most part followed by pleasure and
pain. Of course, we could claim this exception for the definition of
philia, but is very unlikely that this concession was meant to cover
philia, especially since philia is not even mentioned in this context.
It seems then that while all other emotions (at least the ones
defined in the Rhetoric) are characterized by a typical relation to ei-
ther pleasure or pain or both, it is an anomaly of philia (together with
its corresponding opposite misos) that it is not connected with pleas-
ure and pain; and this again might be seen as a further reason for
thinking that at the end of the day philia is no real emotion or that
no real emotions correspond to the relation of friendship. My sug-
gestion for solving this problem is the following: 
Aristotle does not revive the Platonic tradition according to
which pleasure and pain are the highest genera of emotions; rather,
pleasure and pain are among the components of fully fledged emo-
tions, but it is nowhere determined what functional role they are
supposed to play. I take the formula ‘are followed by pleasure and
pain (hepetai)’ not as temporal succession, but as something like an
implication: if there is an emotion, there are also occurrences of
pleasure and pain —no matter how they are related to the other
components of the emotion. Fear, for example, is said to be identi-
20. Eudemian Ethics II 4, 1221b37.
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cal with pain or painful agitation derived from the imagination of a
future harm, but in the case of anger Aristotle insists that the pain
derived from an insult or humiliation is the cause of the anger in the
narrow sense. Or, to take another example, the emotion called charin
echein (to be grateful or thankful) only has an indirect relation to
pleasure and pain, since the feeling of being grateful is always caused
by a favour someone did for us, and the favour again is something
that relieves us of a burden or pain.21 If we generalize the observa-
tions made in these examples, we can say that the occurrence of emo-
tions is somehow connected with pleasure and pain, but that there
are various ways in which pleasure and pain are related to other com-
ponents of the complex state called emotion. 
This account would be flexible enough to accommodate the
problematic emotion of philein or philia, for in Rhetoric 1381a3-8,
which immediately follows the definition of philein, Aristotle makes
an endeavour to prove that the wish or wanting philia consists in has
immediate implications that can be described in terms of pleasure
and pain: 
“This being assumed, a friend is necessarily one who shares
pleasures in good things and distress in painful things, not for
some other reason but because of the friend. For all rejoice
when the things they want come to be, but are pained when the
contrary happens, so that pains and pleasures are signs of what
we want. — τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον εἶναι τὸν
συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς λυπηροῖς μὴ διά
τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον· γιγνομένων γὰρ ὧν βούλονται
χαίρουσιν πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς
βουλήσεως σημεῖον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.”22
As soon as we are really concerned about our friends, we cannot
avoid feeling pleasure and pain about the things that happen to them.
Thus, we have a link between philia and pleasure and pain that is not
21. Rhetoric II 7, 1385a22-23.
22. Rhetoric II 4, 1381a3-8 (translation based on Kennedy).
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weaker than in the case of other emotions, such as anger and grati-
tude. But isn’t the same true of mere good will? In a sense, yes, be-
cause good will is characterized by the same structure that is crucial
for friendship too, namely wanting for someone else what we regard
as good. On the other hand, if Aristotle says, as for example in an
aforementioned passage, Nicomachean Ethics 1166b30ff., that good
will is something that suddenly occurs and vanishes and that does
not lead to appropriate action and cooperation, it seems (again) as if
he regarded good will alone as a mere theoretical preference; since
pleasure and pain have the natural tendency to pursue or maintain
the pleasant state and to avoid or terminate the unpleasant one, it
seems clear that good will that does not lead to action is either with-
out pleasure and pain or beyond the relevant level of these feelings.
Also, since we have the tendency to pursue or maintain the pleasant
state and to avoid or terminate the unpleasant one, desire enters the
stage as soon as pleasure and pain come in. Now, since we have
shown in what respect philia is prone to feelings of pleasure and pain,
we have yet another23 reason for thinking that philia or philein oc-
curs together with a sort of desire —at the very least the sort of de-
sire that is directed towards the pursuit of pleasant states and the
avoidance of unpleasant ones. Given that the association with pleas-
ure and pain is crucial for the Aristotelian concept of an emotion, we
are now much closer to seeing why Aristotle could rate philia and
philein among emotions —in spite of its apparent anomalies. 
V.
Here is another anomaly of philia and philein: the definition of each
of the other emotions implies a specific trigger or reason we have to
be aware of; in the case of anger, we have to be aware of an unjusti-
fied insult that happened to us, in the case of pity, of an undeserved
misfortune that happened to someone else, in the case of indigna-
tion, of the undeserved well-being enjoyed by someone else, in the
23. ‘Another reason’, because we have already seen in the previous passage that if
philein involves appropriate actions, there must be a kind of desire that precedes
these actions. 
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case of fear, of an imminent evil, and so on. It is only the definition
of philein that does not mention such specific reasons; when we are
told that philein is wanting for someone what we regard as good,
there is no reason given for why we have this sort of wish. It is en-
tirely possible that this anomaly in the treatment of philia corre-
sponds to an anomaly in the emotion of love. For example, one
might assume that a person’s likeable or loveable qualities could
serve as a reason for love or, more precisely, as a reason for falling in
love; however, a long-standing loving attitude will not instantly van-
ish when some of these lovable attitudes disappear. Similarly, a long
standing loving attitude to a certain person who has a set of lovable
qualities cannot simply be redirected to a twin or clone of this
beloved person even if this twin displays exactly the same set of lov-
able qualities or even a higher degree of the same set of qualities,
etc. All this is not to say that there are no reasons for love or for
falling in love; however, it seems plain that the causes of love (or
what we regard as its causes, e.g. lovable qualities) do not play quite
the same role as the causes of, say, fear or anger; we do not terminate
love in the absence of the original cause in the same way as we ter-
minate fear or anger when the cause is gone; and while the same
qualities or the same behaviour could bring about anger and fear re-
gardless of the person who displays such behaviour, our loving atti-
tude always concerns particular persons.
However that may be, one might be concerned about the dif-
ficulties that the absence of a proper cause in the Rhetoric’s treat-
ment of philia might bring about for Aristotle’s technique of
persuasion. If the orator can arouse, for example, the audience’s pity
(only) by making them believe that someone has suffered an unde-
served misfortune (i.e. that the proper reason for pity is given), how
could he possibly arouse friendly feelings in the audience, if he is
unable to tell for what reason we have a friendly or loving attitude?
Although the existence of this anomaly in the definition of philein
cannot be disputed, Aristotle seems to provide something like a sub-
stitute for what we have called the ‘reasons’ of an emotion:
After the brief definition of philein as such Aristotle adds, as we
have already heard, some remarks on the philos. He says that the
friend is the one who loves and is loved in return and that people
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think that they are friends when they think that their mutual relation
is of this character (1381a2-3). Assuming that what Aristotle wants
to define here is not just any sort of loving or liking, but the sort of
loving or liking that is typical for friends, it is legitimate to assume
that the remarks on friends are actually meant to complete the def-
inition of philein and philia and are meant to specify what has been
said in the first sentence of the definition about philein. The loving
attitude that is typical for the philos is always reciprocated by the
same loving attitude of the beloved friend. And it also seems to be es-
sential for being a friend that the friends are aware of the friendly
and benevolent attitude of the other. In this reading, the full defini-
tion of philein is divided into three steps: the first step is given in the
basic notion of philein, the second adds reciprocity, and the third
adds the awareness requirement. If we take philein to be an emotive
attitude which, by definition, is an attitude between friends, it seems
an important part of the definition of this emotive attitude that it is
directed towards somebody whom we take to have the same benev-
olent attitude towards ourselves. Accordingly, the benevolent atti-
tude of the other, i.e. the fact that the other person wishes for us
what he or she takes to be good, plays the same role for our loving
attitude as, for example, undeserved misfortune plays for the emo-
tion of pity —provided that we are aware of the other’s benevolent
attitude, and the awareness of the other’s friendly and benevolent
attitude is facilitated by the other’s friendly and benevolent actions.
The advantage of this reading is that philia is not the only emotion
that is left without a proper reason.
At this point one could raise the objection that reciprocity and
mutual awareness of the other’s benevolent attitude is, strictly speak-
ing, a characteristic of the friend and the relation of friendship, not
of the emotion of philein. Well, if we assume that philein is meant as
the kind of loving emotion that characterizes the relation between
friends, this distinction cannot really be upheld. Indeed, in what fol-
lows the definition of philein and philia Aristotle gives an enumera-
tion of which sorts of people we take to be friends or which sorts of
people we love —where ‘thinking that someone is a friend’ comes
down to ‘having friendly feelings for him’ (for this is what the ora-
tor wants to achieve by these topoi, namely to arouse friendly feelings
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in the audience by making them think that certain other people be-
have like friends; of course, it is not the intention of the orator to es-
tablish friendships or to really make people friends, if they are not). 
Similarly one could object that on this account it is hard to
imagine how friendship can ever come about, if the precondition of
the first friend’s friendly feelings is the awareness of the other
friend’s friendly feelings and the other friend’s friendly feelings again
can only come about through the awareness of the first friend’s al-
ready existing friendly feelings. Probably something like the follow-
ing clarification is required at this point: the awareness of someone
else’s good will may bring about a first friendly feeling if the good
will or the benevolent actions are taken as an indication of this other
person’s benevolent and friendly attitude (and this is the effect that
the entire discussion of philia in Rhetoric II 4 is after), while the rela-
tion of friendship in the fullest sense is only given when the mutual
friendly feelings rely on the awareness of the other friend’s friendly
attitude. Something like this could be the rationale behind the pre-
viously quoted remark from the Eudemian Ethics that good will is the
beginning of friendship, but not yet the real thing. 
VI.
The next anomaly in the treatment of philein and philia concerns the
structure of chapter Rhetoric II 4, where this emotion or, rather, the
topoi for arousing this type of emotion are presented. Right at the
beginning of the discussion of emotions in Rhetoric II 1 Aristotle
made clear that in order to arouse a specific emotion in the audience
the orator has to know toward which sort of people we feel a certain
emotion, in what state of mind we are disposed to feel it and for
which reasons we feel it.24 Accordingly, most of the following chap-
ters that are dedicated to the exposition of one particular type of
emotion (or one particular emotion together with its opposite, as for
example shame and shamelessness) have a similar structure: they
start off with a definition of the particular type of emotion and then
24. Rhetoric II 1, 1378a23-28.
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introduce (in different orders) descriptions of people to which an
emotional attitude is directed, of different states of mind in which we
feel a certain emotion and, finally, of reasons why we feel a certain
type of emotion. In most cases the exposition of these three factors
for the arousal of each emotion is followed by a shorter description
of what Aristotle introduces as the opposite to the basic emotion. In
chapter II 4, for example, the exposition of philein and philia is fol-
lowed by a brief treatise on hating and hate. A certain understand-
ing of the opposite emotional state seems to be crucial for modelling
the emotional state of an audience; for if, for example, the audience
happens to be in a hostile mood, the orator who wants to excite
friendly feelings must in the first place handle the pre-existing hos-
tile or hate-filled state of the audience. 
In any case, Aristotle is explicit about the point that one has to
know the three aforementioned factors for each particular type of
emotion —(1) target persons, (2) state of mind, (3) reasons— if one
wishes to elicit an episode of this emotion. For this reason it is re-
markable that of all the emotions treated in Rhetoric II 2-11 the treat-
ment of philein and philia most significantly deviates from the
described structure; instead of going through the three aforemen-
tioned factors —target persons, state of mind, reasons— chapter II
4 merely introduces the definition of philein and philos and then im-
mediately turns to a list of descriptions of people who in the light of
the given definition are necessarily friends (Rhetoric II 4, 1381a4) and
—what turns out to be the same in this context— of people whom
we love in the sense of philein (Rhetoric II 4, 1381a12). This is to say
that of the three factors of each emotion Aristotle discusses only one
in the case of philein —namely the sort of persons whom we take to
be friends or whom we love. The enumeration of such sorts of peo-
ple stretches from the definition of philein and philos almost down to
the transition to the treatment of hostility and hate in line 1381b37
(we will revisit the qualification “almost” shortly), without men-
tioning the state of mind in which we feel love for friends and with-
out dealing with the reasons (dia ti) for this particular type of
emotion. By contrast, most of the other chapters on emotions ded-
icate approximately one third of their main exposition to each of the
three factors. 
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Only four lines before the introduction of hostility and hate
Aristotle switches from the enumeration of the sorts of people whom
we love to two other topics: In lines 1381b33-34 he briefly mentions
three kinds of friendship, in lines 1381b35-37 he announces “things
that are productive (poiêtika) of friendship”, but strictly speaking he
mentions only one such thing, namely doing favours for others; he
points out that the favour should be done for the sake of the other
person, that one should do the favour without being asked and that
one does not have to shout it from the housetops, etc.; it seems ob-
vious that the mentioning of different kinds of friendship cannot be
meant as a substitute for the two missing factors25; in principle,
“things that are productive of friendship” could be meant as a con-
tribution to the missing account of reasons for friendship.26 How-
ever, the two or three lines in which this topic is dealt with cannot
replace a proper discussion of this factor; and the doing of favours to
which these lines refer is just one possible way to prove one’s benev-
olence, while the treatment of other emotions includes a variety of
items that could serve as proper reasons for the particular emotion.
It cannot be denied, then, that the treatment of philein and philia in
Rhetoric II 4 is anomalous in comparison to the treatment of other
emotions in the same book. How can we account for this anomaly?
Or is this once more a possible indication that philia is not meant as
a genuine or regular emotion?
It seems that the anomaly in the treatment of philia precisely
corresponds to the specific nature of philein and philia, without there
being any reason to doubt the emotional dimension of philia, since
25. Kennedy, who to his credit tries to indicate the structure of the chapters on emo-
tion in his translation of the Rhetoric also seems to have noticed that the structure
of the present chapter is different from the others; hence, he seems to be looking
for the first available possibility to indicate the end of the long enumeration of peo-
ple toward whom we have friendly feelings and inserts the subtitle “The causes of
friendship” just before Aristotle mentions the sorts of friendship. This is certainly
misleading, even if the following remarks on things that are productive of friend-
ship may touch on an aspect of the “causes of friendship”. 
26. It might also be remarkable that in the other chapters on emotions the reasons or
causes for a particular emotion are never introduced with this wording. Things that
are poiêtika of friendship are rather factors that are helpful or supportive for ac-
quiring somebody as a friend.
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the absence of the two missing factors —in which state of mind we are
attached to other people on friendly terms and for which reasons—
can be explained as follows. Due to the reciprocal character of friend-
ship and of the corresponding friendly feeling in the fullest sense of
the word, philein is a symmetrical emotional attitude in a sense, as the
one friend is supposed to have the same sort of sentiment that the
other friend has. In this respect loving in the way friends love each
other differs from the other emotions that are treated in the Rhetoric;
if A pities B, there is no reason to assume that B also pities A, and if
A feels anger against B and wishes to take revenge on B, there is no
reason why B should also wish to take revenge on A; but if A loves B
in the way friends do, then B is also supposed to love A in the same
way. For this reason there is also a symmetry between those who love
(in the way friends do) and those who are loved (in the way friends
do); and if this is so, the “state of mind” or the general situation of
people who have or who are disposed to have friendly feelings is the
same as that of those toward whom we have such friendly feelings.
And if this is so, two of the three factors coincide and the state of
mind of people who love can be inferred, as it were, from the state of
mind of people who are being loved. 
The question remains why there is no proper treatment of the
reasons why we love other people as friends. Obviously, the fact that
there is no such discussion in the course of chapter II 4 corresponds
to the observation that we made in the previous section, i.e. that the
definition of philein does not mention such causes. And accordingly,
the required explanation can draw on the results of the previous sec-
tion; since philein includes that we want for our beloved friends what
we regard as good, and since philein in the proper sense is not just
one-sided good will but a mutual sentiment, our friendly feelings
can be elicited by the awareness that someone else has the same
benevolent, friendly feeling toward ourselves. Possibly, such benev-
olent behaviour on the part of others is not strictly speaking the rea-
son for why we wish what we regard as good for this other person;
furthermore, it is possible that we might start having a benevolent at-
titude toward someone else without reciprocating a perceived benev-
olent attitude of this other person. Notwithstanding, we came to see
in the previous section that if we love someone in the way friends do,
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this loving attitude is directed to the equivalent attitude of the friend.
And the conclusion we drew was that friendly feelings can be elicited
if one simply pictures other people as behaving like friends or be-
having like people who want to become friends. 
When Aristotle in the course of chapter II 4 lists various groups
of people whom we love (in the way friends do) or whom we are in-
clined to love, it is indeed one essential criterion that these people
actually behave like friends or behave like people who want to be-
come our friends: for example, he mentions people to whom the same
things are good or bad (1381a8-11) —this seems to be a precondition
for mutually wishing for the other what one takes to be good— or
people who have provided benefits to us (1381a11-14) and people
who have virtues that are beneficial (1381a20-26) and people who are
zealous to please us, to admire us, etc. (1381b10-14). The general
idea in all these cases seems to be that we are inclined to have friendly
feelings for those who behave like our friends or like people who want
to be our friends, and that the identified groups of people display the
sort of benevolent behaviour that is a defining feature of friendship.
Since friendly feelings are directed toward friends or people who be-
have like friends, such behaviour —or, strictly speaking, the aware-
ness of such behaviour— can elicit our friendly feelings, thus playing
a role analogous to that played by the proper reasons in the case of
other emotions. Similarly, as we imagine friends as people with whom
we wish to spend time and whose company is pleasant, Aristotle iden-
tifies several groups of people who display certain qualities of, say,
friendly company: for example, people who are cheerful (1381a29-
33), people who like to joke and are able to get a joke (1381a33-6),
people who are not resentful, but rather forgiving, etc. (1381b2-10).
These people display qualities that we expect from friends and thus
elicit the same sort of feeling that we have toward our friends. Again,
the groups of people whom we love are identified by various sorts of
friend-like qualities and behaviour, and since the perception of such
qualities or behaviour disposes us to have friendly feelings toward
them, there is no need to give additional lists of “reasons” for love. 
Finally, since friendly feelings in the Aristotelian definition is a
mutual liaison, Aristotle seems to be happy in his enumeration to
switch from the description of people who wish to be friends with us
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(indicating this wish by their benevolent or pleasant behaviour) and
people with whom we ourselves wish to be friends.27 For example, we
wish to be friends with people who are esteemed, respected or ad-
mired (1381a26-29). One could try to construe such examples as say-
ing that we love these people because of the virtuous qualities for
which such people are admired, so that the virtuous qualities of these
people would serve as the direct reason for our loving attitude. This
reading would seem to be akin to the well-known doctrine of Nico-
machean Ethics VIII 2, where Aristotle says that the good, the pleas-
ant and the useful are the likeable (philêton) qualities (1155b18-19).
If the treatment of philia in Rhetoric II 4 were to proceed in accor-
dance with this doctrine, Aristotle could simply insist that we love
people for either good or pleasant or useful qualities and could then
explore the causes or reasons for love by enumerating qualities that
fall into one of these three categories. However, nowhere in the
Rhetoric’s treatment of philia is this doctrine invoked. He rather sticks
to the description of types of persons who want to be friends with us
or with whom we would like to be friends. In the case of persons we
admire, we would like to have them as friends not just because of their
virtuous qualities, but, e.g., because the benevolent attitude of such
people would give us the impression that part of the good things
they value would apply to us.28
We have explained then why the Rhetoric’s treatment of philia and
philein can do without an explicit passage on the presumable reasons for
love and how the unusual structure of Rhetoric II 4 can be traced back
to the very nature of the emotion of philein as it was determined by the
definition of philein and philos at the beginning of the chapter. 
VII.
We have pointed out why philein and philia in the Rhetoric are actu-
ally meant as a genuine emotion, although the word philia is mostly
27. When Aristotle introduces for the first time a group of people with whom we our-
selves wish to be friends, he hastens to add the proviso “given that they seem to
want it” (1381a26-27).
28. Cf. Rhetoric I 10, 1371a18-20, where Aristotle explains why being loved is pleasant.
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used to refer to the relation of friendship and not to a sentiment or
emotion. In the account of philein we gave, this ambiguity might to
some extent be intentional, as Aristotle is not out to formulate gen-
eral definition of all kinds of loving affection, but of the kind of
friendly feeling that can be found only between friends. In compari-
son to other emotions in the Rhetoric the treatment of philia exhibits
a series of anomalies, with which we have dealt one by one. None of
these anomalies, however, provided a serious obstacle for regarding
philia as a genuine form of emotion. It still remains unclear why other
emotions are regarded as non-rational and involuntary, while philein,
as a kind of wanting, seems to be rational and deliberate. As for its
voluntary character, it is true that according to Aristotle the begin-
ning of reciprocal love is a matter of decision (according to passage
from Nicomachean Ethics VIII 7 quoted above), while we expect episo -
des of other emotions to be something that happens to us without
any decisive action on our part. It even seems to be a crucial point in
Aristotle’s theory of moral development and education that we can-
not instantly decide to feel the appropriate emotions in a given situ-
ation. Rather, the emotions we happen to experience indicate how
we have lived so far and what long-standing attitudes we have ac-
quired. Now, in the case of philia it is, first of all, not quite clear what
exactly we decide to engage in: a relation, an attitude or an episode
of emotion. Also, what seems to be even more significant, once we are
friends or once have been friends for a period of time, it is no longer
up to us whether we suffer together with our friends or not: being
friends, we rejoice or suffer for the good and bad things that happen
to our friends whether we like it or not. And this particular trait of an
established friendship can also be used to account for the degree of
non-rationality or even irrationality that seems to be connected with
emotions in general; wanting the good for our friends and wanting
them to avoid any evils, we are unable to treat them impartially, and
this is why the judges who have to judge people they like or love are
disposed to think, as Aristotle remarks (Rhetoric II 1, 1378a1 et seq.),
that they have done either no wrong at all or only negligible wrongs.
And if they thus end up judging partially because of their friendly
feelings and in spite of opposing evidence, this would clearly be an ir-
rational effect of philia. 
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